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acknowledged.1 Introduction
Parties in an economic relationship often invest sequentially to enhance the value of
a joint project. In a research joint venture between a large pharmaceutical company
and a specialized biotechnology ﬁrm, the research unit is responsible for the early-stage
development of a new product, while the subsequent manufacturing and sales tasks are
assigned to the downstream company. Similarly, in high tech start-ups, the creativity
and devotion of a founder is decisive for the ﬁrm’s success in its early stages, while the
skills of an experienced management team ( often brought in by a venture capitalist)
becomes crucial in later periods.1
Typically, the investments of both partners are complex and hard to describe or con-
tract upon. Therefore, the question arises of how to design a governance structure
which assigns optimal investments incentives in an indirect manner. The literature has
shown that - in contrast to straight or non-conditional ownership structures - option
contracts may be best suited to attain this goal. Demski and Sappington (1991) were
among the ﬁrst to consider an agency model with sequential investments.2 They show
that if agent B (who invests subsequently) holds an option to sell the asset to agent A
(who invests ﬁrst) after both parties invested, both parties can be led to exert eﬃcient
eﬀort and the ﬁrst best is attained. N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998) extend this result to
a setting where the agents can renegotiate their initial arrangement. They ﬁnd that
an option-to-own contract which grants B the right to buy the asset after both par-
ties invested implements the ﬁrst best. Moreover, renegotiation does not arise on the
equilibrium path, and the ﬁrst best often remains feasible in a stochastic environment
where the asset value is subject to uncertainty.3
The present paper reconsiders this double moral hazard framework with sequential
investments for a situation where agent A is wealth constrained. Then, two inter-
twined issues emerge that are well known from the corporate ﬁnance literature: First,
who should ﬁnance an initial outlay that may be necessary to launch the relationship?
1For a recent survey on research alliances, see Hagedoorn et al. (2000). Sahlman (1990) provides
a thorough assessment of venture capital ﬁnancing.
2See also Banerjee and Beggs (1989) who, however, focus on a speciﬁc production technology.
3Edlin and Hermalin (2000) consider a framework where party A is risk-averse, and focus on option-
to- buy contracts with an exercise date after the ﬁrst agent - but before the second agent - invested.
For the special case of risk-neutral parties, their results imply that eﬃciency can then be attained if
and only if the parties’ investments are substitutive on the margin.
1Second, how can the surplus from the relationship be distributed among the parties
involved? Both questions seem relevant in a variety of economic situations where se-
quential investments play role. In biotechnology joint ventures, the small research
ﬁrm often does not have the monetary endowment to ﬁnance the high-tech equipment
necessary to conduct its research. Likewise, start-up ﬁrms often enter a relationship
with a venture capital fund in order to obtain a seed ﬁnancing. In these and other
situations, it is interesting to ask whether wealth constraints interfere with incentive
considerations, and which mode of ﬁnancing generates optimal incentives. We inves-
tigate two basic possibilities. First, partner B may provide the necessary monetary
resources (which we label ’internal ﬁnancing’). Second, A and B can bring in an third
party (a bank, say) to raise the initial outlay (’external ﬁnancing’).
A broad theme of the corporate ﬁnance literature is that limited liability may have
an adverse impact on the outcome of economic relationships. In the present setting,
however, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints are in fact irrelevant if renegotiation can
be prevented. Internal as well as external ﬁnancing implements the ﬁrst best, and
the optimal initial contract is a two-part arrangement: it consists of (a) a loan given
by either agent B or an outside party C, and (b) an option-to-buy contract between
A and B. Speciﬁcally, the optimal arrangement under internal ﬁnancing resembles a
convertible debt contract under which B can choose whether to insist on a repayment,
or to exercise her option instead.4 We also show that, under internal as well as external
ﬁnancing, any arbitrary distribution of surplus is compatible with the eﬃciency goal.
Hence, each point along the Pareto frontier can be reached and distributional issues
impose no constraint on the optimal solution.
Despite this congruence in results, we also ﬁnd that that the optimal strike price of B’s
option crucially depends on the mode of ﬁnancing. In case of an external investor, the
eﬃcient option price makes agent B in equilibrium just indiﬀerent between investing
and exercising her option or not, and is shown to be the same as in a model where
wealth constraints are absent. Conversely, under internal ﬁnancing, the optimal option
price is ceteris paribus, i.e., for a given distribution of joint surplus, larger than under
4In our model, party B acquires the entire equity as is frequently observed in research joint ventures.
According to Arora and Gambardella (1990), for example, many indicators suggest that biotechnology
ﬁrms are often founded with the intent of later on being sold to a large corporation. In an empirical
study on joint ventures, Bleeke and Ernst (1995) ﬁnd that one partner buys out the other in almost
80% of their sample.
2external ﬁnancing. At ﬁrst sight, this result is counterintuitive because B then strictly
prefers a debt repayment over her conversion option when A invests eﬃciently. This
puzzle is resolved by observing that, when agent A is wealth constrained, B can in many
situations not credibly insist on a repayment when she forgoes own eﬀort because the
asset value is then smaller than her repayment claim. To enforce a debt repayment,
B must then undertake some positive threshold eﬀort which increases the asset value
but reduces her payoﬀ relative to a situation where A has a cash endowment. At a
strike price which is optimal under external ﬁnancing, B thus has a strict preference to
exercise even if A underinvests, which leads A to defect. As a remedy, the strike price
must be raised to a level where B is in equilibrium just indiﬀerent between a repayment
minus the accompanied default eﬀort on the one hand, and eﬃcient investments and
debt conversion on the other.
We then consider a scenario where renegotiation is admitted. Now, the ﬁnancing
constraint may have allocative consequences and preclude an eﬃcient outcome of the
relationship. In particular, A may have an incentive to underinvest for strategic reasons
in order to extract a larger portion of the surplus. Notably, this problem also appears
when A has all the bargaining power ex ante so that the contractual arrangement
allows him to appropriate the entire surplus from the relationship. Intuitively, if A
underinvests, renegotiation becomes necessary in order to induce B to expend the
conditionally eﬃcient eﬀort level. If the initial outlay is positive and/or if the initial
contract promises B or C a large fraction of social surplus, a defection allows A to
default on these claims. Then, A ﬁnds a defection indeed optimal if he is in a suﬃciently
strong bargaining position, and appropriates a large share of the bargaining surplus.
The eﬃciency properties of internal and external ﬁnancing diﬀer in a setting with
renegotiation. In general, internal ﬁnancing dominates when A’s bargaining power in
renegotiations with B and C (which arises after a deviation under external ﬁnancing)
is not signiﬁcantly smaller than in bilateral bargaining with only agent B (which arises
under internal ﬁnancing). Otherwise, however, bank ﬁnancing renders it easier to
mitigate the underinvestment problem so that there may be an eﬃciency-improving
role for third parties. Finally, we argue that a combination of multiple lenders (B and
C) may be optimal if the ﬁrst best cannot be attained in a arrangement with a single
lender. In particular, multiple lenders combine the advantages of internal and external
ﬁnancing: while the lender’s default payoﬀ under internal ﬁnancing is larger (because
3B will invest to increase this default payoﬀ) which reduces the renegotiation surplus
for party A, external ﬁnancing may reduce A’s strength in renegotiations because he
now faces two opponents.
Our results contribute to earlier ﬁndings on the optimal governance and ﬁnancial struc-
ture of a wealth-constrained ﬁrm. Among others, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and
Hart and Moore (1995) consider models where the asset (the ﬁrm) exists for two peri-
ods, in which the ﬁrm owner can expend noncontractible productive investments. At
the end of each period, a non-veriﬁable cash ﬂow is realized. If renegotiation is infea-
sible, the optimal debt contract gives the investor the right to liquidate (part of) the
asset after the ﬁrm’s default on repayments after the ﬁrst period. While this liquida-
tion is ineﬃcient, it reduces the ﬁrm’s incentives to default strategically. Bergl¨ of and
von Thadden (1994), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
show that, if renegotiation is feasible, the optimal capital structure calls for a combi-
nation of long-term and short term investors with claims of diﬀerent priority. In line
with our results, the presence of multiple investors may reduce the ﬁrm’s anticipated
renegotiation gain after a default, which renders it less attractive to defect on a repay-
ment obligation on short-term debt. The present paper thus draws on these previous
contributions, but is also diﬀers from them in several respects. Most importantly, we
assume that two parties rather than one have to expend non-contractible investments
which makes it eﬃcient to change ownership titles during the course of the relation-
ship.5 Also, we consider a situation where the asset value materializes only at the end
of the game, implying that repayment decisions cannot impose a shutdown threat on
the ﬁrm owner. Despite these diﬀerences, we also ﬁnd that the optimal contractual
arrangement may resemble ﬁnancing schemes that are observed in reality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework.
In Section 3, we analyze the model for the case where renegotiation is infeasible, while
Section 4 considers renegotiation. Section 5 contains some brief concluding remarks.
5In independent work, Schmidt (2000) analyzes a similar model where a wealth constrained start-
up entrepreneur E and a venture capitalist V C expend sequential investments. His model conﬁnes
attention to the case of internal ﬁnancing and (in contrast to the other papers in the literature)
assumes the asset value to be veriﬁable which renders shared-equity arrangements feasible. Finally,
V C can only undertake a binary rather than a continuous eﬀort after E invested. Disregarding the
possibility of strategic default which is the focus of the present paper, it is shown that convertible
debt facilitates the ﬁrst best in a variety of situations.
42 The Model
We consider a model with two risk-neutral agents A and B who start a relationship and
sequentially invest into an asset. At date 0, the partners sign an initial contract, and
a monetary seed investment K ¸ 0 has to be incurred. At date 1, party A can expend
an idiosyncratic investment (which will be referred to as eﬀort) a 2 R
+
0 . At date 2, the
initial contract may be renegotiated, before agent B undertakes her own eﬀort b 2 R
+
0
at date 3. Both investments are in physical capital so that the asset value neither
depends on its ﬁnal owner nor on the further engagement of either party. The asset
value v(a;b) materializes at date 4, and the game ends at date 5 where repayments are
made, options may be exercised, and ﬁnal payoﬀs are realized.
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We make the following informational and contracting assumptions. Both parties have
complete information throughout the game. Moreover, the monetary seed investment
K is contractible, while the idiosyncratic eﬀort levels a and b are not. Likewise, the
asset value v(a;b) is non-veriﬁable to outsiders and thus cannot be contracted upon.
In what follows, we also impose
Assumption 1. The function v(¢) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increas-
ing in both arguments, strictly quasiconcave, and satisﬁes (subscripts denote deriva-
tives)
a) v(a;b) > 0 for all (a;b) > 0 and v(0;0) = 0.
b) vii(¢) < 0; limi!0vi(¢) = 1 and limi!1vi(¢) = 0 for i 2 fa;bg.
c) vab(¢) ¸ 0 for all (a;b).
5According to part a), the joint project has a non-negative gross value for any feasible
combination (a;b). If neither party expends eﬀort, this value is normalized to zero.
Part b) ensures that some positive but ﬁnite investment levels are optimal provided
the project should be started. Finally, part c) states that investments are (weak)
complements at the margin. We thus focus on the natural case where the return
on, e.g., basic research is small if not combined with complementary skills such as
production experience and marketing know-how, and vice versa.6
For subsequent reference, we compute the ﬁrst-best investments (aFB;bFB) which max-
imize the ex-ante surplus,
S(a;b) = v(a;b) ¡ a ¡ b ¡ K: (1)
Throughout, we suppose that the relationship should be started, i.e., v(aFB;bFB) is
suﬃciently larger than the monetary seed investment K. Then, (aFB;bFB) are strictly
positive and uniquely deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions
va(a
FB;b
FB) = 1 and vb(a
FB;b
FB) = 1: (2)
Let ˆ S(a;b) = v(a;b)¡b be the joint continuation surplus after A invested. Also, deﬁne
b¤(a) = arg maxb ˆ S(a;b) as the ‘conditionally’ eﬃcient investment level of party B for
given a, so that b¤(aFB) = bFB. Notice that B will expend b¤(a) when she anticipates
to be asset owner and therefore residual claimant for the return from her own eﬀort at
date 5.
After A invested, the parties may ﬁnd it useful to rescind their initial contractual
arrangement and write a new one. For convenience and in line with the literature, we
suppose that the outcome of these renegotiations is described by the generalized Nash-
bargaining solution. When renegotiations occur at date 2, the agents therefore share
the eﬃciency gain above their respective default payoﬀs according to a linear sharing
rule.7 We parameterize A’s bargaining strength in bilateral renegotiations with B by
° 2 [0;1], while B has a relative bargaining power (1 ¡ °).
6As mentioned in the Introduction, this assumption implies that option contracts with an exercise
date before B invested (i.e., at date 2) do not implement the ﬁrst best even if limited liability is
disregarded [see Edlin and Hermalin (2000)]. Most of our subsequent results extend to the case of
substitutive investments as well. See the discussion in footnote 14 below.
7This eﬃciency gain is the diﬀerence between the maximal joint continuation surplus ˆ S(a;b¤(a)),
and the sum of the default payoﬀs.
6As a useful starting point of analysis, let us ﬁrst consider a situation where A is not
wealth-constrained and ﬁnances the initial outlay K out of own funds. Suppose that
A is asset owner at date 0 and A and B do not sign an initial contract.8 After A
invested a at date 1, B will at date 3 undertake the conditionally eﬃcient investment
b¤(a) only if she anticipates to become residual claimant. Hence, the parties will (if
feasible) renegotiate the initial governance structure at date 2 where B buys the asset.
Since B will clearly not invest when A retains ownership, A’s default payoﬀ at the
renegotiation date 2 is given as v(a;0). Accordingly, and presuming it is eﬃcient to
start the project, his maximization program at date 1 reads
max U
A(a) = v(a;0 + °[v(a;b
¤(a)) ¡ b
¤(a) ¡ v(a;0)] ¡ K ¡ a; (3)
and the unique equilibrium eﬀort ˆ a is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
(1 ¡ °)va(ˆ a;0) + °va(ˆ a;b
¤(ˆ a)) = 1: (4)
This condition immediately reveals that ˆ a < aFB when investments are complemen-
tary, because va(a;0) < va(a;b¤(a)) in this case.9 Only if investments are marginally
independent, A invests eﬃciently and non-conditional ownership attains the ﬁrst best
provided renegotiation is feasible. In the next sections, we analyze option contracts and
ask whether this contingent governance structure can overcome the ineﬃcient outcome
under non-contingent ownership. Thereby, we disregard the possibility of renegotiation
in Section 3, while renegotiation is taken into account in the subsequent Section 4.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In related papers, Demski and Sappington (1991) and N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998)
have shown that option contracts generically facilitate an eﬃcient outcome. These
models suppose that both parties possess a suﬃciently large monetary endowment
and, consequently, limited liability is no matter of concern. Also, no monetary outlay
is required at the start of the relationship. As we will see in subsection 3.1 below, an
eﬃcient outcome remains feasible if a seed investment is needed but A is not wealth
constrained. After analyzing this benchmark, we incorporate a wealth constraint on
8Notice that A will not expend any eﬀort when B initially owns the asset.
9Similarly, if investments are substitutive, we have ˆ a > aFB.
7A’s side who then cannot ﬁnance K, and also cannot assure B’s participation in the
venture by providing an upfront payment. Subsection 3.2 considers a situation where
B ﬁnances the asset start up. Subsequently, in subsection 3.3, we examine external
ﬁnancing by a bank C which has no further productive role.
3.1 Wealthy Agents
Suppose A and B sign the following arrangement (L;R;p) at date 0. Under the terms of
contract, A initially owns the asset and B provides some (possibly negative) monetary
loan L. At date 5, B can then either insist on (or provide) a repayment R, or she can
alternatively exercise an option-to-buy. If B exercises, she disburses a strike price p and
acquires asset ownership. Notice that B will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest and to exercise
her option if and only if v(a;b¤(a)) ¡ b¤(a) ¡ p ¸ R. We now demonstrate that this
conditional ownership arrangement in combination with a debt-like ﬁnancial structure






for some arbitrary combination (L;R) that is compatible with each agent’s participa-
tion constraint. Imagine A undertakes an eﬀort a ¸ aFB at date 1. Then, B invests
b¤(a) and exercises her option-to-buy at date 5 because her associated continuation
payoﬀ v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a)¡p¤ at least weakly exceeds R. Therefore, A will never invest
more than aFB because B reaps the return on any excess eﬀort. We must also show that
A will not invest less than aFB. Suppose a < aFB. Then, B refrains from any invest-
ment and insists on the repayment R at date 5 because R > v(a;b¤(a)) ¡ b¤(a) ¡ p¤.
Hence, A’s payoﬀ is UA(a < aFB) = S(a;0) + L ¡ R which is strictly smaller than
UA(a = aFB) = S(aFB;bFB) + L ¡ R. As a consequence, a < aFB cannot be A’s
preferred choice for strike price p¤. Notice that this result applies for any feasible loan
and repayment levels. Thus, if A is not wealth-constrained, L as well as R can be
chosen as desired to divide the ex-ante surplus S(aFB;bFB) between both parties.
We can state the following proposition which is an extension of results found in Demski
and Sappington (1991) and N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998).10
10As mentioned in the Introduction, Demski and Sappington analyze option-to-sell rather than
option-to-buy contracts. One can show that both contracting types have identical economic conse-
8Proposition 1. Suppose that A is not wealth-constrained. For any K ¸ 0, an option-
to-buy contract (L;R;p) with strike price p¤ = v(aFB;bFB) ¡ bFB ¡ R implements
eﬃcient investments and distributes the joint surplus in any desired way by appropriate
choice of (R;L).
Proposition 1 shows that the start-up cost K per se does not hamper an eﬃcient
outcome of the relationship. If A is not wealth-constrained, it is in fact irrelevant
which party bears the monetary seed investment. For example, if one switches from
L = 0 to L = K so that B ﬁnances the asset start up, a reduction of the option price
by an amount R = K leaves the equilibrium payoﬀs of both parties unaﬀected, and
does not distort their incentives to expend value-enhancing eﬀort.
3.2 Financing Constraints
We now explore whether the implementation result of Proposition 1 carries over to a
setting where A is wealth constrained, which seems relevant in many real-life situa-
tions (including venture capital ﬁnancing and research joint ventures). Observe that
Proposition 1 applies for any conceivable level of the initial monetary payment L that
ﬂows from B to A. Therefore, even if A is wealth-constrained, B’s participation and
the asset start up can be ensured under an option contract with strike price p¤ if both
parties continue to invest eﬃciently. This reasoning seems to suggest that A’s lack
of monetary resources does neither aﬀect the optimal contract nor the implementable
outcome. Perhaps counterintuitively, though, we show that an option contract with
price p¤ may lead party A to underinvest. Fortunately, a modiﬁed strike price is found
to restore a ﬁrst-best outcome under internal ﬁnancing.
While a detailed formal analysis is relegated to the Appendix, it is useful to give an
intuitive explanation for these results. Recall that if A is not wealth constrained, he
will not underinvest under an option-to-buy contract with strike price p¤ because B
then refuses to invest b > 0 and insists on a repayment R. Since A appropriates
the maximum overall surplus S(aFB;bFB) minus a constant (R ¡ L) when he invests
eﬃciently and B’s continuation payoﬀ cannot fall below R, any deviation from aFB
can only hurt A and is thus self defeating.
quences whether or not wealth constraints are admitted. Therefore, we can without loss of generality
focus on option-to-buy contracts to shorten the exposition.
9If A is wealth-constrained, however, B’s default strategy b = 0 after observing a < aFB
may no longer be optimal. To see this, consider R ¸ L = K and A expends an eﬀort
so small that v(a;0) < R. Notice that eﬀort levels with this property exist for any
K > 0 by Assumption 1.11 Then, A has to default on repayment R when B exerts no
eﬀort, and B has a legal claim on the asset and becomes owner at date 5. However, if
A goes indeed bankrupt and B seizes the collateral, b = 0 cannot be her best response







maxfbjv(a;b) · Rg if v(a;0) · R
0 otherwise:
The threshold investment ˜ b(a;R) represents the minimal eﬀort which B must expend
for given a to enforce the repayment R.12 If ˜ b(a;R) is positive, B’s best reply is one
of two actions: either, she undertakes the threshold investment ˜ b(¢) where A is just
able to repay. If this eﬀort level is the optimal response, B insists on a repayment and
her continuation payoﬀ becomes R ¡ ˜ b(a;R). The corresponding payoﬀ of A is then
strictly smaller than S(aFB;bFB) ¡ (R ¡ L) so that a deviation from aFB cannot be
proﬁtable. Alternatively, the best continuation action for B may be to expend b¤(a) and
to appropriate the asset. If b¤(a) < ˜ b(a;R), this strategy is always dominant because
b¤(a) by deﬁnition maximizes the continuation value of the asset, and B acquires it
costlessly at date 5 where A is still unable to repay. Again, a deviation cannot be
worthwhile for A who is left with a non-positive payoﬀ. Finally, though, consider a
situation where
˜ b(a;R) < b
¤(a) (C1)
11They also exist if B has to be promised a positive share of total surplus, i.e., if R > 0 even if
K = L = 0.
12Throughout the main text, we will without loss of generality concentrate on loan levels L = K.
For L > K where the initial loan exceeds the seed investment, A retains a monetary endowment
L¡K. Hence, he can repay his debt for given (a;b) whenever (L¡K)+v(a;b) ¸ R. In order to leave
B’s equilibrium surplus unaﬀected, an increase in L must be accompanied by an identical increase in
R. Accordingly, the threshold investment ˜ b(a;L;R(L)) does not vary in L for any given distribution
of total surplus. All proofs in the Appendix allow for loan levels L > K, so that ˜ b(¢) is there deﬁned
as maxfbjv(a;b) · R ¡ (L ¡ K)g if v(a,0) · R ¡ (L ¡ K), and ˜ b(¢) = 0 otherwise.
10and notice that this condition holds (at least) for deviations a close to aFB.13 Clearly, B
can then again exert ˜ b(a;R) and claim R (which, of course, remains optimal if ˜ b(¢) = 0).
Alternatively, however, she may undertake an investment b¤(a), subsequently exercise
her option-to-buy at strike price p¤, and obtain a continuation payoﬀ v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a)¡
p¤. In this latter case, A appropriates a total payoﬀ UA(a) = p¤ ¡ a which is clearly
larger than his utility when investing eﬃciently. One can easily check that, if (C1) is
satisﬁed, b¤(a) is agent B’s optimal response on A’s defection if v(a;b¤a))¡b¤(a)¡p¤ >







¤(a)] < ˜ b(a;R): (C2)
We can now state the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1. Suppose A is wealth-constrained and the parties sign an option contract
with strike price p¤. Then, this contract fails to implement the ﬁrst best whenever there
exists some investment level a which satisﬁes conditions (C1) and (C2). In particular,
eﬃcient investments cannot be implemented if v(aFB;0) < R.
Importantly, the lemma states that agent A may deviate from eﬃcient investments
under strike price p¤ even if the eﬀort aFB allows him to capture the entire social
surplus, e.g., if R = K. If he is wealth constrained, he can ‘force’ B to expend a
positive investment even after a defection. B may then even ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to expend
b¤(a) and to buy the asset, although this reduces her overall surplus below (R¡L). In
a word, A may sacriﬁce eﬃciency and exploit his limited liability strategically in order
to extract a larger share of the social surplus.
It is easy to see that defection always arises if v(aFB;0) < R, i.e., if K > 0 and/or B
has some bargaining power ex ante, and if B’s investment is suﬃciently important. In
these cases, ˜ b(a;R) is strictly positive for any deviation a < aFB. At least for a slight
underinvestment of party A, agent B then strictly prefers to invest b¤(a) > ˜ b(a;R),
and buys the asset at price p¤ because condition (C2) is satisﬁed. To illustrate this,
consider the quasiconcave Cobb-Douglas production function v(a;b) = ayby;y < 1=2.
For this functional form, we have v(a;0) < K and ˜ b(a;R) = R1=y=a for any positive
a;K. Suppose A invests slightly less than aFB and observe that ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a) for
13Since R < v(aFB;bFB) is necessary to satisfy A’s participation constraint, we must have ˜ b(a !
aFB;R) < b¤(a ! aFB) = bFB.
11this deviation. For a ! aFB, the left-hand side of (C2) converges to zero while ˜ b(a;R)
converges to a strictly positive value for any R ¸ K. Accordingly, an option contract
with strike price p¤ does not implement eﬃcient investments.
We now show that a modiﬁed option price may nevertheless facilitate an eﬃcient





FB ¡ R +˜ b(a
FB;R):
Then, we have
Proposition 2. Consider internal ﬁnancing. Then, an option-to-buy contract with
strike price p¤¤ generically implements eﬃcient investments, and distributes (by proper
choice of R ¸ K) the joint surplus S(aFB;bFB) in any desired way. In particular, the
optimal strike price is strictly larger than p¤ unless ˜ b(aFB;R) = 0.
Proof: see the Appendix.
At ﬁrst glance, one may wonder how B can be induced to invest and to exercise
her option at a strike price p¤¤ > p¤. Even if A invests eﬃciently, B at this larger
strike price strictly prefers a repayment R over her option-to-buy and the accompanied
investments. Using our previous arguments, though, this puzzle can easily be resolved.
If A is wealth-constrained and v(aFB;0) < R, B cannot recover R without expending
own investments ˜ b(a;R), which reduces her continuation payoﬀ below R. At an option
price p¤ and for a = aFB, agent B therefore has a strict rather than a weak preference
to choose bFB and to acquire the asset. Moreover, A will exploit this preference because
he can underinvest (at least in some range) without running the risk that B does not
exercise subsequently.
The steeper option price p¤¤ = p¤ + ˜ b(aFB;R) resolves this problem. The argument
proceeds in two steps. First, provided A invests eﬃciently, B is at price p¤¤ just
indiﬀerent between investing eﬃciently and exercising her option, or to undertake the
threshold investment ˜ b(aFB;R) and to claim R. To see this, recall that B prefers the
former strategy at strike price p if and only if
v(a;b
¤(a)) ¡ b
¤(a) ¡ p ¸ R ¡˜ b(a;R): (5)
By construction of p¤¤, this condition is satisﬁed with equality for a = aFB. Second,
we must show that B will not exercise her option for any a < aFB, but instead choose
12the threshold investment ˜ b(a;R) and insist on a debt repayment. From (??), this
behavior is indeed optimal if v(a;b¤(a)) ¡ b¤(a) +˜ b(a;R) is strictly increasing in a. In
the Appendix, we demonstrate that this monotonicity condition is always satisﬁed if
investments are independent or complementary at the margin, i.e., under Assumption
1c). Accordingly, since B will invest eﬃciently and disburse p¤¤ only if a ¸ aFB, agent
A will not deviate from aFB and an eﬃcient outcome is attained. We should emphasize
that the above reasoning applies for any feasible repayment level R. Hence, one can
choose R arbitrarily in order to distribute the social surplus S(aFB;bFB) between both
parties.
Under internal ﬁnancing, limited liability thus does not preclude eﬃcient sequential
investments if renegotiation is infeasible.14 In contrast to the framework where A has
a monetary endowment, though, the optimal option price may be one which does not
make party B indiﬀerent between exercising her option on the one hand, and to claim
a repayment on the other. Rather, the option price may be so large that she has
strict preferences for a repayment but anticipates that an enforcement of this claim
will require costly eﬀort.
3.3 External Financing
We now suppose that A does not rely on B to ﬁnance the initial outlay, i.e., L = 0.
Instead, he signs a debt contract with an external investor C (e.g., a bank) which at
date 0 provides a loan LC ¸ K and holds a repayment claim RC to be exercised at
date 5.
Speciﬁcally, consider the following arrangement: A signs an option-to-buy contract
(p¤;L = R = 0) with B and a debt contract (LC;RC) with the external investor C.
Suppose A invests eﬃciently. Then, B will expend bFB and exercise her option at date
14To show this, we relied on the assumption that investments are weakly complementary, vab(¢) ¸ 0.
While an ineﬃcient outcome may possibly arise for substitutive investments, I was unable to construct
an example where this is actually the case. Edlin and Hermalin (2000) have shown that, if wealth
constraints are disregarded, an option contract with exercise date 2 facilitates the ﬁrst best if (and
only if) investments are substitutive on the margin. Hence, in order to prove that an option contract
can trigger an ineﬃcient outcome under internal ﬁnancing with substitutive investments, one would
also have to check this alternative type of contractual arrangement which is outside the scope of the
present work. We should note that - with the exceptions of Proposition 2 and Proposition 4(b) below
- all results in the present paper also hold in situations where investments are strict substitutes.
135, and A repays her debt RC (which is smaller than p¤) to agent C. It remains to
show that A cannot gain by investing less than aFB. If he does, B will expend no
eﬀort because this would yield a negative continuation payoﬀ while she can guarantee
herself a reservation payoﬀ of zero by not investing. Accordingly, A’s payoﬀ in case
of a deviation is either zero [if v(a;0) < RC in which case C seizes the asset], or it is
S(a;0)¡(RC ¡LC) [if v(a;0) ¸ RC so that A can repay]. Either payoﬀ is smaller than
S(aFB;bFB) ¡ (RC ¡ LC) so that a defection cannot be proﬁtable. Thus,
Proposition 3. Suppose A is wealth-constrained and K is raised from an external in-
vestor C. Then, an option-to-buy contract p¤(R = 0) implements eﬃcient investments
and a ﬁrst-best outcome prevails. Also, any distribution of surplus among all three
parties can be ensured via a ﬁxed payment from C to B.
The logic behind this proposition is simple. If B does not ﬁnance the initial outlay,
she is not locked into the relationship before expending own investments. Therefore,
A cannot exploit his limited liability to hold up B and to force her to invest in order
to protect her repayment claims after A defected. Relying on an external investor
prevents hold up exactly because this investor has no productive role. In addition,
the initial arrangement can assign parties B and C any arbitrary share of the joint
surplus. To see this, consider a contract extension under which B receives from C an
unconditional ﬁxed payment, say T. Clearly, the size of this lump sum transfer has no
eﬀect on eﬃciency and the parties’ equilibrium rents are UB = T, UC = RC ¡LC ¡T,
and UA = S(aFB;bFB) ¡ (RC ¡ LC).
A simple contractual arrangement among A, B and an external investor C thus imple-
ments the ﬁrst best if renegotiation is infeasible.15 While this outcome replicates the im-
plementation result under internal ﬁnancing, the construction of the optimal strike price
of B’s option diﬀers across regimes. In particular, and in contrast to internal ﬁnancing,
the optimal strike price now exactly coincides with the one in a model where limited
liability and ﬁnancing issues do not arise. Consequently, when external investors are
admitted and renegotiation can be prevented, there is no loss of generality in conﬁning
attention to an option-to-buy contract with strike price p¤(R = 0) = v(aFB;bFB)¡bFB.
15Notice that external ﬁnancing generically implements the ﬁrst best even if investments are strict
substitutes. Hence, this ﬁnancing mode may strictly dominate internal ﬁnancing for vab(¢) < 0. See
also footnote 14.
144 Renegotiation
In our discussion of section 3, we found that the relationship between A and B yields
an eﬃcient outcome if renegotiation is infeasible after A expended his eﬀort. It is now
interesting to ask whether under which conditions this positive outcome extends to a
scenario where renegotiation is allowed for. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose the parties can renegotiate their initial arrangement after A
invested. Then, we have:
(a) If A is not wealth constrained, an option-to-buy contract with strike price p¤
attains eﬃcient investments and the initial contract is not renegotiated. Hence,
Proposition 1 fully applies.
(b) If A is wealth constrained and B provides the start-up ﬁnancing, an option-to-buy
contract p¤¤ implements a ﬁrst-best outcome unless there exists some eﬀort level





¤(a) ¡ (R ¡˜ b(a;R))] ¡ a (C3):
Otherwise, A underinvests and a ﬁrst-best outcome cannot be implemented.
(c) If A is wealth constrained and an external investor C contributes the start-up
ﬁnancing as a loan with repayment claim RC, an option-to-buy contract p¤(R = 0)
between A and B facilitates a ﬁrst-best outcome unless there exists some eﬀort
level a with ˜ b(a;RC) > 0 such that
p




¤(a) ¡ v(a;0)] ¡ a (C4);
where °A is A’s Nash bargaining parameter in trilateral renegotiations with A and
B. Otherwise, A underinvests under external ﬁnancing.
Proof: see the Appendix.
In a setting where A is not wealth constrained, our previous ﬁndings continue to apply
if renegotiation is admitted. In fact, Proposition 4(a) is a straightforward extension
of results in N¨ oldeke and Schmidt (1998). Even if renegotiation is feasible, B can
always insist on a repayment so that her overall equilibrium utility cannot fall below
15(R ¡ L). Likewise, she cannot insist on renegotiation if A invests eﬃciently (see the
proof of Lemma 1). Since A reaps the entire social surplus from the relationship minus
the constant (R ¡ L) when he expends eﬃcient eﬀort, any deviation cannot raise his
surplus and eﬃciency prevails.
The other parts of the proposition, however, establish that the opportunity to rene-
gotiate may hamper an eﬃcient outcome of the relationship. Proposition 4(b) shows
that in case of internal ﬁnancing A may defect and choose an investment level smaller
than eﬃcient. In view of our previous arguments, this result is easily explained. Under
an option contract with strike price p¤¤ (which remains optimal), B will on a deviation
never respond with a default investment b > ˜ b(a;R). If b¤(a) · ˜ b(¢), her preferred de-
fault eﬀort is b¤(a) in which case she seizes the asset and A will not deviate because no
renegotiation arises. Conversely, if b¤(a) > ˜ b(¢), B expends a default eﬀort ˜ b(¢) which is
smaller than the conditionally eﬃcient level. Therefore, the parties renegotiate at date
2 and A reaps a fraction ° of the bargaining surplus [v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a)¡(R¡˜ b(a;R))]. If
this payoﬀ net of the corresponding investment a exceeds p¤¤¡aFB, A ﬁnds a defection
proﬁtable and an eﬃcient outcome becomes infeasible. Intuitively, A may underinvest
under internal ﬁnancing because this forces B into renegotiation, and diminishes her
overall utility signiﬁcantly below (R¡˜ b(aFB;R)¡L) if A’s own bargaining position is
suﬃciently strong.16
Proposition 4(c) asserts that underinvestment may also arise under external ﬁnancing
when renegotiation is taken into account. The reason for a possible defection under C-
ﬁnancing is however quite diﬀerent. If A underinvests, he cannot hurt B who will simply
not invest and obtain her reservation utility. For any investment such that ˜ b(a;RC) > 0
which implies v(a;0) < RC, though, A causes an externality on C who then cannot
recover his loan and seizes the collateral unless renegotiations are successful.17 If these
renegotiations proceed as Nash bargaining among all three involved parties,18 A again
captures a part of the negotiation gain [v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a)¡v(a;0] . Provided (C4) does
16To see that defection can indeed arise under internal ﬁnancing, consider a situation where
˜ b(aFB;R) > 0 (e.g., the Cobb-Douglas value function). Since ˜ b(¢) decreases in a, the maximizer
of the right-hand side of (C3) must be strictly smaller than aFB for any ° · 1. Since (C3) is satisﬁed
with equality for a = aFB and ° = 1, A will thus defect for ° suﬃciently close to unity.
17Recall that B will not invest after observing a < aFB, so that C seizes the asset and obtains a
pre-renegotiation payoﬀ v(a;0) < RC.
18While we consider Nash bargaining for simplicity, a qualitatively identical result is obtained for
more sophisticated bargaining rules as, for instance, the Shapley value.
16not apply, A does not deviate and a ﬁrst-best outcome remains feasible. Conversely, if
(C4) applies for some a where A is unable to repay his initial loan, a deviation cannot
be avoided and the possibility of renegotiation imposes a binding constraint on the
feasible outcome.
To further assess these ﬁndings, it is interesting to note that (C4) is never satisﬁed if
A’s bargaining parameter in trilateral renegotiations with B and C is small. Hence,
if °A is suﬃciently smaller than ° because, for instance, the external investor has a
strong bargaining position, external ﬁnancing may facilitate the ﬁrst best while internal
ﬁnancing does not.19 On the other hand, suppose °A = ° so that A’s bargaining
strength in negotiations with B and C is no smaller than under internal ﬁnancing.
Then, internal ﬁnancing dominates external ﬁnancing when renegotiation is admitted:
since B expends no default investment after a deviation under external ﬁnancing, but
exerts a positive default eﬀort under internal ﬁnancing, the bargaining surplus is strictly
smaller in the latter case.20 In addition, the non-deviation payoﬀ in (C4) is strictly
larger than in (C3). Taken both eﬀects together, internal ﬁnancing renders it easier to
implement eﬃcient investments if °A = ° and thus becomes unambiguously preferable
in this case.
Finally, we want to argue that a combination of internal and external ﬁnancing may
facilitate the ﬁrst best if renegotiation is feasible and a single lender triggers a sub-
optimal outcome.21 Suppose B provides a loan of size ¯K; ¯ 2 [0;1], and C one of
size (1¡¯)K to cover the start-up cost. For simplicity, suppose these loan levels coin-
cide with the lenders’ repayment claims RB and RC with RB + RC = R, respectively.
Consider a situation where A defects under pure external (¯ = 0) and pure internal
19Similar observations on the virtues of external ﬁnancing have been made in the literature. Aghion
and Tirole (1994) show that external ﬁnancing can improve the bargaining position of a client vis-a-vis
the researcher (the agent) in a research project, and facilitate an eﬃcient allocation of property rights
even if the agent is wealth constrained.
20In technical terms, we have v(a;0) < R¡˜ b(a;R) = v(a;˜ b(¢))¡˜ b(¢) because v(a;b)¡b is increasing
in b for any b < b¤(a), while ˜ b(¢) < b¤(a) is a necessary condition for a deviation.
21Joint ﬁnancing is empirically relevant. For example, the internet broker priceline.com recently
announced its plans to expand into Europe [see Priceline Press release, June 28, 2000]. Priceline.com
Europe is a new company in which priceline.com and the venture capital fund General Atlantic are
investors and jointly fund the company. Under the terms of contract, priceline.com purchases a
convertible note allowing the company to take up to a 50% equity stake in priceline.com Europe
under certain conditions. Until that note is converted, priceline.com will not hold an equity stake in
the new venture.
17ﬁnancing (¯ = 1). Now, consider multiple lenders and suppose that A and B hold
claims of the same priority. In addition, suppose A and B sign an option contract with
strike price ˜ p¤¤ = v(aFB;bFB) ¡ bFB ¡ RB + ˆ b(aFB;RB) where ˆ b(a;RB) is implicitly
deﬁned by ¯v(a;ˆ b) = ¯K = RB. Notice that ˆ b(a;RB) = ˜ b(a;R) because agent B’s
default eﬀort is insensitive with respect to ¯ (for ¯ > 0) if both claims have the same
priority. If A deviates in a way that ˜ b(a;RB) < b¤(a), the default investment of agent B
is therefore ˜ b(a;R), and all three parties renegotiate in order to realize the bargaining
surplus [v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a)¡(RB ¡˜ b(a;R))]. Since A appropriates a fraction °A of this







B ¡˜ b(a;R))] ¡ a (C5):
Consider some a with ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a) and ¯ close to unity. For any such a, (C5) is
harder to satisfy than (C4) because ˜ p¤¤¡RC > p¤(R = 0)¡R and RB¡˜ b(a;R) > v(a;0).
Moreover, for °A < °, (C5) is also more demanding than condition (C3). Accordingly,
A will ﬁnd it less attractive to deviate if B and C jointly ﬁnance the initial outlay.22
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a scenario where two parties A and B sequentially invest in
an asset whose setup requires an initial outlay. The model is suited to represent, e.g.,
the relationship between a start-up ﬁrm and a venture capitalist, or between a biotech
ﬁrm and a pharmaceutical company in a research joint venture. We assume that the
idiosyncratic investments of both parties and the ﬁnal asset value are noncontractible.
In line with existing work, it was shown that an option-to-buy contract generically
implements the ﬁrst best if A is not wealth constrained. This outcome extends to
a setting with wealth constrained agent if renegotiation can be prohibited after A
expended his eﬀort. In this case, a debt contract between A and either B or an external
investor in combination with an option-to-buy contract facilitates eﬃcient investments.
22The literature has identiﬁed a variety of circumstances where multiple lenders can be beneﬁcial.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show that multiple outside investors can alleviate the problem that a
long-term project is stopped prematurely after ﬁrst-period proﬁts turned out low. Bergl¨ of and von
Thadden (1994) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that multiple (long-term and short-term)
creditors reduce the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ in renegotiations and accordingly reduce its incentives to default
strategically.
18The optimal strike price of B’s option depends on which of those ﬁnancing modes is
chosen. Under certain conditions, a ﬁrst best can also be attained if renegotiation
is feasible. In general, however, the performance of internal and external ﬁnancing
now diﬀers and we characterize conditions under which one ﬁnancing form dominates
the other. Finally, a combination of internal and external investors may restore an
eﬃcient outcome if renegotiation is feasible. Overall, our ﬁndings shed some light on the
relative performance of internal and external ﬁnancing in relationships with sequential
investments. They also reinforce the by now well received wisdom that option-to-buy
arrangements are often a proper tool to govern the incomplete-contracting relationship
between parties who invest sequentially, and show how these arrangements should be
augmented to account for ﬁnancing constraints.
19Appendix
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the following arrangement (L;R;p¤). At date 0, B contributes a payment
L ¸ K. At date 5, she can then insist on a repayment R ¸ K, or can at that date
exercise her option and acquire the asset at a price p¤ = v(aFB;bFB) ¡ bFB ¡ R.
Suppose A invested aFB at date 1. We must distinguish between two subcases. If
B expends b = bFB at date 3 (note that a larger investment is never proﬁtable), she
will subsequently exercise her option-to-buy at date 5 because v(aFB;bFB)¡p¤ strictly
exceeds R. Accordingly, B’s continuation payoﬀ after date 0 is v(aFB;bFB)¡bFB¡p¤ =
R and she attains an overall payoﬀ UB = R ¡ L. Second, she may undertake an
investment b < bFB and insist on a repayment at date 5. If v(aFB;b) + [R ¡ L] ¸ R,
A can meet his repayment obligation and B’s overall payoﬀ is weakly smaller than R
which cannot be optimal. Conversely, if v(aFB;b) + [R ¡ L] < R, A cannot meet his
repayment obligation. In this case, B seizes the asset as well as A’s remaining cash
endowment [R¡L] as a collateral. Again, her continuation payoﬀ is then weakly smaller
than R so that B will undertake bFB at date 3 provided that A invests eﬃciently at
date 1.
We now examine whether A gains by deviating from aFB. Observe that his overall
payoﬀ for eﬃcient investments is UA = S(aFB;bFB) ¡ [R ¡ L], and his participation
constraint requires R < S(aFB;bFB)+L. To start with, notice that a deviation a > aFB
cannot be optimal because B still exercises her option-to-buy so that A recovers no
return on any excess investment. Consider now an arbitrary deviation a < aFB. Let
˜ b(a;R) be the threshold investment level as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 for L = R and as
deﬁned in footnote 13 for L > K. A is able to repay his debt if B chooses an eﬀort
level b ¸ ˜ b(¢). Notice that A will never choose an investment a for which ˜ b(a;R) = 0
because B can then insist on a repayment R without expending own eﬀort. Hence, we
can concentrate on deviations a where ˜ b(a;R) is positive.
Consider ﬁrst deviations from aFB where ˜ b(a;R) > b¤(a). If B responds by some b <
˜ b(a;R), A cannot repay and B seizes the asset as well as A’s monetary endowment (L¡
K) at date 5. Moreover, b = b¤(a) is B’s optimal response because she appropriates the
entire continuation surplus v(a;b¤(a))¡b¤(a) as well as A’s remaining cash endowment
20when exerting b¤(a). Since A is left with a non-positive surplus, she will never deviate
from aFB in a way that ˜ b(a;R) ¸ b¤(a).
Consider now deviations such that ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a). If B responds by some b < ˜ b(a;R),
she again seizes the asset at date 5. Her locally best reply is an eﬀort level close to
˜ b(a;R), which gives B a continuation payoﬀ slightly smaller than v(a;˜ b(¢))¡˜ b(¢)+(L¡
K). Alternatively, B can undertake an investment from the complementary interval
b ¸ ˜ b(a;R). If she does, she can insist on a repayment in which case b = ˜ b(a;R) is
her best reply, and her continuation payoﬀ becomes R ¡ ˜ b(a;R) = v(a;˜ b(¢)) ¡ ˜ b(¢) +
(L ¡ K). Accordingly, a response b < ˜ b(a;R) is dominated, and A will not deviate
whenever B chooses ˜ b(a;R) because his overall payoﬀ is then non-positive. Finally,
though, B may anticipate to exercise her option-to-buy at date 5 in which case she
expends b¤(a)[> ˜ b(a;R)] at date 3. In this latter case, her continuation payoﬀ becomes
v(a;b¤(a)) ¡ b¤(a) ¡ p¤. For ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a), this last strategy is B’s best response if






¤(a)] < ˜ b(a;R): (C2)
If ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a) and (C2) is satisﬁed (which implies ˜ b(a;R) > 0), b¤(a) is B’s optimal
reaction on a deviation a < aFB and she exercises her option at price p¤. Then, A
accrues an overall payoﬀ p¤+(L¡K)¡a which strictly exceeds S(aFB;bFB)¡(R¡L),
so that A deviates from aFB if and only if conditions (C1) and (C2) are violated for
some a < aFB. Finally, we show that defection generically occurs if v(aFB;0) < R so
that ˜ b(a;R) > 0 for any a · aFB. Consider a ! aFB. Then, ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a) because
A’s participation constraint implies R < v(aFB;bFB). In addition, the left-hand side
of (C2) converges to zero while the right-hand side is strictly positive. Accordingly, A
deviates and underinvestment generically occurs at strike price p¤ if v(aFB;0) < R. 2
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2





FB ¡ R +˜ b(a
FB;R) (6)
and notice that ˜ b(aFB;R) > 0 iﬀ v(aFB;0) < R + (L ¡ K). Suppose ﬁrst that A
expends an eﬀort that satisﬁes ˜ b(a;R) ¸ b¤(a), and verify that any such eﬀort level is
smaller than aFB. By the arguments given in the proof of Lemma 1, such a deviation
21cannot be proﬁtable because B will then expend b¤(a) and seize the asset as a collat-
eral. Next, consider investment levels with the property ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a). B will then
either invest b¤(a) and exercise her option (in which case A deviates), or undertake
the threshold investment ˜ b(a;R) and insist on R in which case A’s surplus is smaller








FB;R)] +˜ b(a;R) ¸ 0: (7)
This condition holds with equality if a = aFB so that B will invest eﬃciently and
exercise her option if A indeed expends aFB. Since A will never invest more than aFB,
he will not deviate if (??) is violated for any a < aFB. To see that this condition is
satisﬁed, consider the derivative of the left-hand side of (??) with respect to a, which










Since ˜ b(a;R) < b¤(a), we have va(a;b¤(a)) ¸ va(a;˜ b(a;R)) and vb(a;˜ b(a;R)) >
vb(a;b¤(a)) = 1 if investments are weakly complementary, vab(¢) ¸ 0. Hence, the
left-hand side of (??) is strictly increasing in a. Since B will not exercise her op-
tion when a < aFB and A’s payoﬀ is decreasing in a for any a ¸ aFB, a contractual
arrangement (L;R;p¤¤) will thus implement eﬃcient investments.
Finally, we show that any arbitrary distribution of the social surplus S(aB;bFB) can
be achieved by proper choice of R and L ¸ K. To see this, notice that B’s equilibrium
payoﬀ UB = R¡L¡˜ b(aFB;R) strictly increases in R as long as ˜ b(aFB;R) < b¤(aFB) =
bFB so that dUB=dR = 1 ¡ 1=vb(aFB;˜ b(¢)) > 0. Hence, we must show that - for
any distribution of total surplus - the accompanied repayment level R indeed satisﬁes
the property ˜ b(aFB;R) < bFB. To verify this, notice that ˜ b(aFB;R) < bFB for any
R · ¯ R ´ v(aFB;bFB)+(L¡K) by the deﬁnition of ˜ b(¢). Inserting ¯ R in UB, we obtain
UB(R = ¯ R) = v(aFB;bFB)¡bFB¡K > S(aFB;bFB). For R = ¯ R, agent B appropriates
more than the entire social surplus so that R ¸ ¯ R violates the participation constraint
of agent A. Conversely, for any R < ¯ R, ˜ b(a;R) < bFB is satisﬁed which completes the
proof. 2
22Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4(a) follows immediately from Proposition 1 and results in N¨ oldeke and
Schmidt (1998). If A expends a ¸ aFB, B has no credible threat to invest less than bFB
at date 3 so that renegotiation does not arise. Also, A will never invest less than aFB
because B can assure herself a continuation payoﬀ R by not investing and insisting on
the repayment at date 5, and because date-2 renegotiations will only raise this payoﬀ.
Since A reaps S(aFB;bFB) ¡ (R ¡ L) when investing eﬃciently, any deviation reduces
his payoﬀ and hence cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
To prove Proposition 4(b), observe ﬁrst that B cannot credibly insist on renegotiation
if A chooses an investment a ¸ aFB (see Lemma 1). If A invests a < aFB, B’s
default response under an option contract with strike price p¤¤ is (a) b¤(a) if b¤(a) ·
˜ b(a;R), and (b) ˜ b(a;R) if b¤(a) > ˜ b(a;R) (see Proposition 2). In the former case, no
renegotiation occurs and B seizes the asset as a collateral at date 5 because A cannot
repay. Hence, A reaps a non-positive payoﬀ and a deviation cannot be optimal. In
the latter case, B’s default investment ˜ b(a;R) is strictly smaller than the conditionally
eﬃcient level. Accordingly, the parties renegotiate at date 2, and B acquires the asset
in order to ensure the conditionally eﬃcient investment b¤(a). In these negotiations, A
appropriates a payoﬀ °[v(a;b¤(a)) ¡ b¤(a) ¡ (R ¡˜ b(a;R))] under Nash bargaining. He











is satisﬁed (condition (C3)). In the main text, we show that a deviation can indeed
occur for ° suﬃciently large. Finally, one can verify that A will underinvest for any
strike price p < p¤¤ because B then exercises her option in some range where a < aFB.
Conversely, B never exercises for a = aFB and p ¸ p¤¤ by construction of p¤¤.
To prove proposition 4(c), notice again that A will never expend a > aFB. Hence,
consider a deviation a < aFB. For any such deviation, B will expend zero eﬀort if
renegotiation fails. Also, notice that A will never deviate in a way that ˜ b(a;RC) > 0,
i.e., v(a;0) < RC, because C can then insist on a repayment RC at date 5. Hence,
consider deviations which satisfy v(a;0) < RC and suppose date-2 renegotiations are
unsuccessful. Then, A cannot repay RC at date 5, and C seizes the asset and obtains
a continuation payoﬀ v(a;0). In equilibrium, renegotiation is successful and allows to
23realize a bargaining gain [v(a;b¤a)) ¡ b¤(a) ¡ v(a;0)]. Assuming that the outcome of
renegotiation is described by the 3-persons Nash-bargaining rule, agent A appropriates
a fraction °A of this bargaining surplus. Therefore, he will deviate from a = aFB if and










¤(a) ¡ v(a;0)] ¡ a (C4):
To give an example, suppose the asset value is v(a;b) = 2a1=2+2b1=2. For this functional
form, one obtains aFB = b¤(a) = bFB = 1 and S(aFB;bFB) = 2 ¡ K. Noting that A
will choose a = 0 when he deviates so that v(a;0) = 0, condition (C4) reads 2 ¡RC ¸
°A[2(bFB)1=2 ¡ bFB] = °A which is violated (at least) if K > 2 ¡ °A. Hence, external
ﬁnancing cannot implement an eﬃcient outcome if K 2 (2 ¡ °A;2). 2
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